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Abstract:	Mather’s	(2019)	provocative	claim	that	octopuses	have	a	mind	hinges	on	the	inference	that	
their	 striking	 behavioural	 flexibility	 is	 evidence	 of	 “complex”	 cognitive	 abilities.	 I	 discuss	 alternative	
explanations	--	not	to	deny	the	possibility	of	complexity	but	to	point	out	that	current	evidence	does	not	
allow	us	to	draw	firm	conclusions.	Only	an	agnostic	approach	will	 lead	to	the	systematic	investigation	
of	octopus	behaviour	and	ultimately,	greater	insights	into	the	cognitive	capacities	of	these	fascinating	
creatures.	
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Mather	 (2019)	 provides	 a	 valuable	 synopsis	 of	 octopus	 perception,	motor	 control	 and	 behavioural	
flexibility	to	support	the	conclusion	that	the	octopus	has	a	mind.	One	of	the	key	pillars	of	Mather’s	
reasoning	 is	 that	 the	 striking	 behavioural	 flexibility	 observed	 in	 octopuses	 is	 evidence	 of	 complex	
cognition,	which	in	turn	requires	a	mind.	As	pointed	out	by	other	commentators,	Mather’s	claim	that	
octopuses	have	a	mind	is	problematic	because	the	author	does	not	provide	a	clear	definition	of	‘mind’	
(Mallatt,	2019).	As	 it	 currently	stands,	 the	 term	 ‘mind’	 is	 too	vague	 to	validate	or	disprove	through	
scientific	testing	(Schnell	and	Vallortigara,	2019).	
I	will	 focus	on	an	equally	problematic	point	 in	Mather’s	approach	 (cf.	Gutfreund,	2019):	 the	
author’s	interpretation	of	what	we	currently	know	about	octopus	behaviour	as	clear-cut	evidence	of	
complex	cognition.	In	Mather’s	words:	‘…octopuses	can	perform	the	operations	suggested	by	Emery	
and	 Clayton	 (2004)	 as	 indicative	 of	 cognitive	 ability	 in	 mammals	 and	 birds	 —	 flexibility,	 causal	
reasoning,	 prospection,	 and	 imagination’.	 In	 Figure	 7,	 Mather	 provides	 interesting	 examples	 of	
octopus	behaviour	that	supposedly	demonstrate	these	cognitive	abilities	(see	also	Mather	and	Dickel,	
2017).	For	example,	the	carrying	of	coconut	shells	by	veined	octopuses	(Finn	et	al.,	2009)	is	classified	
as	 an	 example	 of	 prospection	 –	 the	 ability	 to	 plan	 for	 the	 future.	 Mather	 also	 suggests	 that	 the	
Passing	 Cloud	 display	 (Packard	 and	 Sanders,	 1971)	 and	 the	 avoidance	 of	 stinging	 anemones	 (Ross,	
1971)	 provide	 evidence	 of	 causal	 reasoning	 –	 the	 ability	 to	 identify	 the	 functional	 relationship	
between	a	cause	and	its	effect.		
These	interpretations	should	be	considered	speculative	because	we	have	limited	evidence	to	
date	that	alternative	explanations	for	these	behaviours	can	be	dismissed.	Moreover,	the	evidence	of	
cognitive	 abilities	 such	 as	 future	 planning	 and	 causal	 reasoning	 is	 itself	 still	 being	 debated	 in	
cognitively	 advanced	 and	 more	 established	 model	 animals	 such	 as	 apes	 and	 corvids	 (Penn	 and	
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Povinelli,	2007;	Redshaw	et	al.,	2017;	Suddendorf	and	Corballis,	2007).	Veined	octopuses	might	carry	
coconut	shells	today	because	they	can	envisage	that	these	tools	can	provide	a	benefit	in	the	future,	
(that	 they	can	be	arranged	 into	a	den	 in	case	of	a	predatory	attack).	But	 this	hypothesis	has	never	
been	tested;	so	any	inference	about	the	cognitive	underpinnings	of	this	fascinating	behaviour	requires	
caution.	 We	 cannot	 exclude	 the	 possibility	 that	 other,	 simpler,	 mechanisms	 may	 trigger	 this	
behaviour.	 For	 example,	 octopuses	may	 -	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 any	 prospective	 ability	 -	 carry	 around	
coconut	 shells	 only	 because	 these	 objects	 have	 previously	 become	 associated	 with	 a	 positive	
outcome,	 such	 as	 a	 thwarted	 attack	 by	 a	 predator	 or	 reduced	 stress	 from	 being	 covered	 by	 a	
protective	casing	(Amodio	et	al.,	2019).		
Similar	 arguments	 can	 be	 raised	 about	 the	 other	 putative	 examples	 of	 causal	 reasoning	 in	
cephalopods.	Passing	Cloud	 is	a	skin	display	characterized	by	a	well-defined	dark	area	that	seems	to	
‘move’	 directionally	 on	 the	 animal’s	 body	 (Packard	 and	 Sanders,	 1971).	 Cephalopods	 most	 often	
exhibit	this	to	startle	prey,	as	well	as	conspecifics	or	other	animals.	While	 it	 is	theoretically	possible	
that	the	Passing	Cloud	could	involve	causal	reasoning,	this	interpretation	is	premature	without	careful	
empirical	testing.	We	cannot	yet	rule	out	that	Passing	Cloud	has	a	strong	genetic	component	and/or	
simple	learning	mechanisms.	Similarly,	octopuses	may	develop	avoidance	of	stinging	anemones	as	a	
result	of	associative	 learning	when	physical	 interactions	with	the	anemone	have	previously	become	
associated	 with	 a	 negative	 outcome	 (see	 also	 Godfrey-Smith,	 2019).	 Ross	 (1971)	 reported	 that	
octopuses:	 (i)	behave	as	 if	 they	have	 received	a	 ‘punishment	 stimulus’	 after	 touching	an	anemone,	
and	(ii)	progressively	inhibit	their	predatory	response,	selectively,	toward	hermit	crabs	that	have	had	
a	stinging	anemone	attached	to	their	shells.	
In	 comparative	 psychology,	 careful	 testing	 of	 alternative	 explanations,	 paired	 with	 the	
constraint	 of	 parsimony,	 often	 favours	more	 ‘basic’	mechanisms,	 such	 as	 associative	 learning,	 over	
‘higher-order’	 cognitive	 processes.	 This	 approach	 can	 foster	 a	 dichotomous	 view	of	 cognition,	with	
the	 risk	 of	 dismissing	 crucial	 nuances	 (cf.	 Amodio	 et	 al.,	 2018;	 Penn	 and	 Povinelli,	 2007).	 Our	
understanding	 of	 non-human	 animals	 can	 be	 increased	 by	 exploring	 how	 these	 putatively	
independent	systems	work	together	(Cheke	et	al.,	2011).	There	is	no	guarantee	that	favouring	simpler	
cognitive	 explanations	 brings	 us	 closer	 to	 the	 truth.	 However,	 inferring	 sophisticated	 cognitive	
abilities	without	appropriate	controls	for	simpler	explanations	can	be	even	more	problematic:	It	can	
fuel	misleading	beliefs,	particularly	in	non-scientists,	who	lack	the	specialized	background	knowledge	
and	tools	to	evaluate	such	claims	critically.	
Cephalopods	 are	 fascinating	 creatures.	 With	 their	 large	 brains,	 learning	 skills,	 and	 flexible	
behavioural	 repertoires,	 these	 molluscs	 are	 promising	 models	 for	 the	 study	 of	 complex	 cognition	
(Amodio	 et	 al.,	 2019;	 Amodio	 and	 Fiorito,	 2013).	 But	 our	 current	 understanding	 of	 cephalopod	
cognition	 is	 still	 too	 limited	 to	 allow	 us	 to	 draw	 firm	 conclusions	 about	 the	 cognitive	mechanisms	
underlying	their	behaviour.	Future	research	may	eventually	support	Mather’s	view	that	octopuses	are	
capable	of	future	planning	and	causal	reasoning.	For	the	time	being,	though,	it	may	be	wiser	to	adopt	
an	 optimistic	 agnosticism	 (sensu	 stricto	 Lurz	 et	 al.,	 2014),	 suspending	 acceptance	 until	 compelling	
evidence	is	collected.	
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